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Brimmer: Economic growth and structural unemployment

Economic Growth and
Structural Unemployment
Address by
Andrew F. Brimmer
President
BRIMMER AND COMPANY, INC.
Economic and Financial Consultants
A fundamental issue in the current debate over national economic
policy concerns the best way to attack the problem of structnral unemployment. The natnre of the difficulty is reasonably well understood:
even when the economy is expanding and overall joblessness is declining, unemployment within certain groups is cut very little - if at all.
Blacks are heavily represented among those suffering from persistent
structural unemployment. A number of depressed geographical areas
(both urban and rural) also bear a disproportionate share of the types
of unemployment that do not respond appreciably to improvement in
economic conditions.
The question of structnral unemployment was one of the topics discussed at the White House Conference on Balanced National Growth
and Economic Development held in January, 1978. I participated in the
General Session which focused on the subject: "Structural Unemployment: Should We Move People to Jobs or Jobs to People." In my assignment, I tried to spell out as carefully as possible some of the key
background elements which I believe must be considered in any search
for ways to reduce structnral unemployment.
Given my own professional experiences (which have been mainly in
the area of national economic policy rather than in the development or
management of manpower programs), when I accepted the invitation
to participate in the program, I indicated that I would attempt to provide a macro-economic perspective on the challenges we face (and the
opportunities open to us) in the effort to create jobs for disadvantaged
workers.
Dr. Brimmer is President of Brimmer and Company, Inc., a Washington, D.C.-based economic
and financial consulting firm. From March, 1966, through August, 1974, he was a Member of the
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve.System.
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The problems of structural unemployment have attracted a number
of experts who have first-hand experiences gained through frontline
contact with - and daily struggles to overcome - the obstacles which
impede the employment of labor market participants with few saleable
skills. I can make little or no contribution to that part of the agenda.
However, I have identified a number of key elements which I believe
should receive consideration in the search for ways to reduce structural
unemployment. These are discussed in subsequent sections of these
remar ks. The highlights can be summarized here:
- A fundamental pre-condition for the success of any specially-targeted
program to cope with structural unemployment is a vigorous and sustained expansion in overall economic activity. A sluggish economy (even
if recessions are avoided) is a harsh and inhospitable soil for the cultivation of jobs for the hard-to-employ.

I
I

}

- The strategic role of economic growth in the generation of jobs is clearly
demonstrated by the experience over the last decade and a half. The 16
years ending in 1977 were divided equally between eight years of sustained economic expansion and eight years of recession, inflation, and
stagnation. The effects on jobs stand out sharply: the first half of the
period was one of expanding jobs and declining unemployment. The
second half was one of slow growth in jobs and sharply rising unemployment.
- Against this background, the Carter Administration's proposed $25 billion tax reduction for individuals and businesses represents a wise move.
Without such action, the American economy would face a "growth
recession" in 1979 - meaning a rise in real gross national product less
than the 4.0 percent necessary to prevent an increase in unemployment.
- Whenever we focus on structural unemployment, there is no way to
avoid an explicit appreciation of the distressing situation among blacks
as a group, and not simply among black teenagers. During the 1973-75
recession, blacks had to bear a disproportionate share of the burden of
increased unemployment. Moreover, during the last 33 months of
economic recovery. blacks have gotten a smaller fraction of the added
jobs compared with their relative position in the labor market. Ovcr the
same period, the level of unemployment among blacks actually rose
slightly, while total unemployment declined noticeably.
- In preparing programs to attack structural unemployment, it is necessary
to keep in mind a number of changing demographic characteristics of the
civilian labor force, since these will have an impact on. the competition
for jobs in the years ahead. For example, over the last decade and a half,
a dramatic rise in the participation of both women and teenagers in the
labor force has aggravated unemployment. However, over the next several years, as the shadow of the 1960' s drop in birth rates is cast into the
1970's and 80's, the youth population will decline. The result will be a
slight lessening in labor market pressures following from fewer teenagers
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seeking jobs. The effect on labor markets of increased job-seeking by
women will also moderate somewhat over the remainder of this decade.
But, on balance, the above-average participation of both women and
teenagers in the work force will continue to make it hard to reduce structural unemployment.
- Another long-run trend which must be kept in mind is the differential
rate of growth in population, jobs and money income in central cities
compared with the suburbs in major metropolitan areas. As is generally
recognized, over the last decade and a half, most central cities have experienced an absolute decline in population. But a substantial number of
these cities have also had a relatively larger absolute decline in the number of jobs. The net effect has been a clear tendency for the cities to fall
behind relative to the suburbs.
- Among many persons concerned with structural unemployment, a considerable amount of hope is being attached to the Humphrey-Hawkins
bill, which aims at a significant reduction in the excessively high level of
unemployment over the next five years. However, my assessment of the
potential impact of the proposal leads me to be less optimistic than most
of the bill's proponents.
- In particular, too much hope is being placed on the expected expansion
of public service jobs. Instead, we must look to greater efforts to increase
openings on private payrolls.
- In this regard, it is clear that private employers will need some kind of
federal government subsidy to help offset the extra costs of hiring any
significant number of marginal workers. If the $400 million of subsidy
recently recommended by the Carter Administration were nsed with
imagination, perhaps 252,000 entry-level jobs could be created. The
same amount spent on public service jobs may generate only 44,000 new
openings.
- In addition, private employers will also need inducements to locate production, distribution and service facilities in central cities - from which
many firms are continuing to migrate. Liberalized use of the investment
tax credit could help offset the extra costs of making investment expenditures in these areas.
Each of the above conclusions is amplified in the rest of these
remarks.

Economic Growth and Employment
The strategic role of economic growth in generating jobs shows
through clearly in the statistical evidence tracing changes in output and
employment during the last decade and a half. The longest sustained
expansion in economic activity in the post World War II period occurred during the eight years 1961-1969. As shown in Table 1t, over

t See Appendix, page 59.
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these years gross national product corrected for inflation (real GNP)
rose at an average annual rate of 4.5 percent. The civilian labor force
climbed by 10.3 million; employment rose by 12.2 million, and the
number of unemployed workers dropped by 1.9 million. These figures
represented annual average rates of change of 1.7 percent, 2.1 percent,
and 6.0 percent, respectively. Over these eight years the overall unemployment rate decreased from 6.7 percent in 1961 to 3.5 percent in
1969.
Even more striking was the decrease in long-term unemployment (27
weeks and over). In 1961 there were 804,000 persons in this categoryrepresenting 17.1 percent of the total unemployment of 4,713,000. By
1969 the number of long-term unemployed had shrunk to 133,000 and
accounted for only 4.7 percent of total joblessness, which in turn had
fallen to 2,832,000.
In sharp contrast, between 1969 and 1977 (also a period of eight
years), real GNP expanded at an average annual rate of 2.7 percentfar below the historical trend of approximately 3.6 percent over the 30
years ending in 1977. The reasons for this relatively poor performance
of the national economy were a mixture of inflation, recession, and
stagnation - partly caused by a five-fold jump in the price of oil but
also aggravated by a combination of inappropriate monetary and fiscal
policies. In this environment the civilian labor force continued to
expand - climbing by 17.0 million. However, the number of jobs rose
by only 13.1 million; and unemployment jumped by 3.9 million. These
figures represented average annual rates of change of 2.4 per cent, 1.9
percent, and 11.5 percent respectively. During this second eight-year
period, the overall unemployment rate rose from 3.5 percent to 6.9
percent of the civilian labor force.
The impact of these trends on the long-term unemployed was
predictable. Between 1969 and 1977 this category of joblessness rose by
813,000 to 946,000. Last year, the latter figure was equal to 14.0 percent of total unemployment - which in turn had climbed to 6,772,000.
In summary, the last decade and a half of American economic history can be divided equally between eight years of sustained economic
expansion and eight years of recession, inflation, and stagnation. The
effects on jobs stand out sharply: the first half of the period was one of
expanding jobs and declining unemployment. The second half was one
of slow growth in jobs and sharply rising unemployment.
What is the lesson to be learned from the foregoing experience? It is
unmistakable: a sustained, high level of real economic growth is a necessary underpinning for any program to create jobs for the disadvantaged.
What are the prospects for economic growth and employment in the
years ahead? At this juncture, the outlook is uncertain - since the outcome depends substantially on the fortunes of the Carter
-38'-

i

!

l

http://digitalscholarship.bjmlspa.tsu.edu/rbjpa/vol2/iss1/4

4

Brimmer: Economic growth and structural unemployment

Administration's tax reduction-tax reform proposals announced on
January 21, 1978. In broad terms, the Administration recommended a
net reduction of $24.5 billion of federal income taxes paid by individuals and businesses. This figure is the result of tax reductions
amounting to $33.9 billion partly offset by increases of $9.4 billion
recommended under the heading of "tax reform." Individuals would
receive about $16.8 billion (over two-thirds) of the net tax reductions,
and $5.7 billion (just under one-quarter) would benefit the business
sector. The remaining $2.0 billion would represent a reduction in excise
taxes on telephones and the repeal of the recently enacted increase in
unemployment insurance taxes. The tax reductions would become effective in fiscal year 1979, which begins October 1,1978.
The Administration explained that one objective of the proposed tax
reduction is to spur economic growth - which in turn would create
extra jobs and speed the reduction in unemployment. The expected
impact of the proposals in this regard can be seen in Table 2 t, based
partly on estimates prepared by the Council of Economic Advisors
(CEA). It will be noted that the CEA concluded that, in the absence of
a tax cut, the growth rate of real GNP would be about 4.3 percent from
the fourth quarter of 1977 through the fourth quarter of 1978.
Through 1979 the rate would ease off to 3.8 percent and then increase
to 4.9 percent through the end of 1980. If the tax reductions become
law according to the recommended schedule, the growth rates for real
GNP may be lifted to 4.7 percent through the fourth quarter of both
1978 and 1979 and to 5.0 percent through the end of 1980.
Expressed in terms of overall economic performance, the tax reductions are expected to lift real output by $20.9 billion above the level it
might otherwise reach. Moreover, the added stimulus would help to
avoid a "growth recession" in 1979 - meaning a rise in real GNP of
less than the 4.0 percent necessary to prevent an increase in unemployment.
If the cut in taxes does not materialize, the overall unemployment
rate (which averaged 6.8 percent in the final quarter of 1977) may
decline to 6.3 percent by the end of this year. The same rate may prevail
in the fourth quarter of next year, and the rate might decline only
slightly to 5.9 percent by the end of 1980. With the tax reductions in
place, the unemployment rate may decline steadily to 6.2 percent at the
end of this year, to 5.8 percent in the final quarter of 1979, and to 5.3
percent by the end of 1980.
The level of employment is also expected to rise as the economy
responds to the stimulus of tax reduction. By the end of 1978, an extra
70,000 jobs may have been created. As the full impact of the tax cut
benefits are registered, about 700,000 additional jobs would be available by end of 1979. The number would be up to 900,000 by the close
qf 1980.

t See Appendix, page 59.
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Finally, the fiscal stimulus is expected to generate a larger increase in
output (1.4 percent) than in the rate of inflation (0.5 percent). Thus, on
balance - and judged in terms of the impact on economic growth and
employment - the proposed tax reduction is clearly desirable.
Differential Employment Experiences: Black vs. White

IIi

At this point we can turn to a discussion of the differential job experience of black and white workers in recent years. In general, during
the 1973-75 recession blacks had to bear a disproportionate share of the
burden of increased unemployment. Moreover, during the last 33
months of recovery they have gotten a smaller fraction of the added
jobs compared with their relative position in the labor market. Over the
same time period, the level of unemployment among blacks actually
rose slightly - while total unemployment declined noticeably.
The major dimensions of labor market trends can be traced in Table
3t, showing changes in the civilian labor force, employment, and unemployment, by color, sex and age from March, 1975, through December,
1977. These months mark the recovery of the economy from the 197375 recession - a recovery which began in the Spring of 1975.
These data document the fact that - so far in the recovery - blacks
have not participated in the job rebound as fully as have whites.
Between March, 1975 and last December, the total civilian labor force
rose by 7.5 percent; the corresponding figures for blacks and whites
were 13.0 percent and 6.8 percent, respectively. During the same
period, total employment expanded by 10.0 percent; black employment
climbed by 14.9 percent; and jobs held by whites rose by 9.4 percent.
However, the growth in the black labor force (13.0 percent) almost
equaled the rise in black employment (14.9 percent). Consequently,
over this 33-month period, the number of blacks without jobs rose by
1.8 percent - while total joblessness among whites declined by 23.2
percent.
Reflecting these mixed trends, the total unemployment rate (which
had been 8.5 percent in March, 1975) had decreased to 6.4 percent in
December of last year. The rate last month for whites was 5.6 percent.
The unemployment rate for blacks in December was 12.5 percent only slightly below the 13.9 percent registered when the national
economy reached the bottom of the last recession.
In every demographic category, black unemployment rates by
December of 1977 had fallen proportionately less than was true of their
white counterparts. The extent to which black unemployment has
decreased less during the recovery can be seen in the behavior of the
black-white unemployment ratio. In March 1975, the overall ratio was
1.78. For youth, it was 2.26; for adult males 1.85; and for adult

t See Appendix, page 59.
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females 1.49. By December, 1977, the overall ratio had climbed to 2.23;
the ratio for youths was 2.96; for adult males 2.22; and for adult
females, 1.90.
Further insights into the deterioration of blacks' position in the labor
market over the last 33 months can also be gotten from the data in
Table 3. These figur'es show blacks as a percentage of the civilian labor
force, employment, and unemployment, by color, sex, and age in
March, 1975; December, 1976; and December, 1977. By comparing
their employment and unemployment percentages with their share of
the civilian labor force, one can get a rough impression of the extent of
the short-fall in blacks' participation in the recovery. For example, in
March, 1975 blacks represented 11.3 percent of the labor force; they
held 10.6 percent of the jobs, and they accounted for 18.6 percent of
the total unemployment. Thus, in the Spring of 1975, blacks had a
"deficit" of 0.7 percentage point in their share of jobs and a "surplus"
of 7.3 percentage points in their share of unemployment. Similar calculations are made for blacks by sex and age.
.
Using these calculations, one can trace the progressive deterioration
in blacks' position over the last 33 months. By December of last year,
their overall job deficit had risen to 0.8 percentage points, and their
burden of surplus unemployment had climbed to 11.4 percentage
points. The same pattern of deterioration is evident among all categories of black employment.
These mixed - and distressing - black-white employment patterns
must be kept in mind as the quest is pursued to expand job opportunities for the disadvantaged.
We can now turn to an assessment of several long-run trends in the
labor force and employment patterns. These will have a direct bearing
on the magnitude of the structural unemployment problem in the
future.
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Long-Term Labo r Force Trends
Over the last decade and a half, the growth of the civilian labor force
has reflected a number of fundamental changes in the nature and
extent of participation by both women and teenagers. As is generally
known, the changing composition of the adult population (which in
turn is a reflection of variations in birth rates) is a principal determinant of the potential size of labor force. The high birth rates recorded in
the aftermath of World War II - combined with the greatly expanded
participation of women in the labor market - have caused the civilian
labor force to increase rapidly, at a rate averaging over 2 percent per
year since 1960. On the other hand, the drop in the birth rate during the
1960's and early 1970's will cause a slackening in the rate of labor force
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expansion during the rest of this decade. For example, the population
16 to 19 years old (the youth component of the civilian labor force) rose
by 1.3 percent in 1975. However, this population group increased 0.8
percent in 1976, and by 0.1 percent in 1977. But, as the shadow of the
1960's drop in birth rates is cast into the 1970's, the 16 to 19-year-old
population will decline by 0.2 percent in 1978; by 0.6 percent in 1979;
and by 1.1 percent in 1980.
During the last decade and a half, teenagers accounted for a sizable
fraction of the rise in the civilian labor force. For instance, between
1960 and 1977, the civilian labor force rose by 29.3 million persons.
About 4.5 million of this increase (or 15.4 percent) was accounted for
by teenagers. As a result, teenagers rose from 7.0 percent of the labor
force in 1960 to 9.5 percent in 1977. The low job attachment of these
young adults and their slow absorption into the labor market have
combined to lift the aggregate unemployment rate well beyond what it
would have been in the absence of the demographic changes noted
above. Moreover, the labor force participation rates of youths 16 to 19
years old declined steadily from the late 1940's until the early 1960's.
Following this period, participation rates began to rise, and the
uptrend was still evident through last year. This turnaround also
expanded the youth component of the civilian labor force. But, as mentioned above, this bulge in the youth population has just about passed
through the labor market, and the youth component of the labor force
should diminish from here on.
The effect on labor markets of increased job-seeking by women will
also moderate slightly over the remainder of this decade. However,
women will continue to account for a sizable fraction of the rise in the
labor force. In 1977 women constituted 36.8 percent of the total labor
force compared with 30.4 percent in 1960. But over this 17-year time
span, the number of adult women in the civilian labor force rose by
15.2 million. This represented 52.0 percent of the total rise over this
period. The quickened participation of women in the labor force has
coincided with a decrease in the fertility rates to 1,862 births per 1,000
women in 1974 compared with a peak of 3,767 in 1957. Data compiled
by the U.S. Census Bureau suggest that birth expectations are now
averaging two per family, suggesting a continuation of low birth rates.
With less time devoted to Child-raising, women entered the labor force
in increasing numbers during the last two decades. Looking ahead,
however, it now appears that the rise in women's participation in the
labor force will be at a somewhat reduced pace.

I
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Trends in Popnlation, Mannfacturing Employment, and
Money Income in Metropolitan Areas
In searching for the best means 'to attack structural unemployment,
we should also keep in mind a number of fundamental long-run trends
which have had an adverse effect on job opportunities for blacks and
other marginal groups in the economy. This set of trends involves the
differential rates of growth in population, jobs, and money income in
central cities compared with the suburbs of our major metropolitan
areas . As is generally recognized, over the last decade and a half most
central cities have experienced an absolute decline in population. A
substantial number of these cities have also had a relatively larger
absolute decline in the number of jobs. The net effect has been a clear
tendency for the cities to fall behind relative to the suburbs.
To enhance understanding of these trends, data relating to
population, income, and manufacturing employment were assembled
for 26 leading metropolitan areas (SMSA's) in the United States. For
the most part, these SMSA's were ranked according to the population
of their central cities in 1973. In each case, the SMSA was divided
between central city and suburbs . Popu lation and money-income
figures for 1960 are shown in Table 4t. The same data for 1973 are
shown in Table 5t. Manufacturing employment for 1963 and 1972 is
presented in Table 6t. Changes in each central city's share of population, manufacturing employment, and money income between 1960
and 1973 are shown in Table 7 t. Figures showing the size of the black
and working-age population in the selected central cities in 1960 and
1970 are recorded in Table 8t. Changes in both population categories
over that decade can be traced in Table 9t.
A number of insights can be drawn from these statistics . For this
purpose, the data in Table7tare particularly instructive. Again, these
figures show changes in the central city's share of population, manufacturing employment, and money income in each of these selected
metropolitan areas between 1960 and 1973. All of the 26 central cities
shown (except Memphis, Tennessee) lost population compared with the
total metropolitan area . In other words, during the J3-year period the
suburbs grew at a much faster rate than did the central cities. The same
general pattern prevailed with respect to manufacturing employment.
In this instance, two of the central cities (Indianapolis, Indiana and
Phoenix, Arizona) increased their share of factory jobs in their respective SMSA's. San Antonio, Texas expanded manufacturing employment at the same rate as the suburbs . In the remaining 23 cities, a decline was recorded in their relative share of factory jobs. The trend of
money income paralleled the trend of population and employment.
Only Indianapolis and Memphis succeeded in expanding money income
originating in the central city at a faster rate than was recorded for the
SMSA as a whole.

t See Appendix, page 59
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Moreover, most central cities saw their share of total SMSA money
income decline at a faster rate than their share of total population. In
other words, while the typical central city lost population, its relative
share of factory jobs and other opportunities for its citizens to earn
income shrank even faster than the decline of total SMSA population.
This meant that the central cities were left with a relatively weaker
economic base than was the case at the beginning of the 1960's.
Along the same lines, the figures in Table 9 show that in all of the 26
central cities (except Phoenix, Arizona) the black population increased
as a percentage of the total. The relative changes were particularly
striking in Detroit, Baltimore, Washington, D.C., Cleveland, and St.
Louis. In the case of Washington, D.C. (where blacks already represented 54 percent of the total population in 1960), the increase lifted
blacks' share of the total to over 71 percent. In Detroit, Baltimore,
New Orleans, and St. Louis, blacks represented over 40 percent of the
population in 1970. In Atlanta the proportion was 51 percent. (In passing, by 1975 blacks represented more than half of the total population
in several of the cities named.)
With respect to the working-age population in these cities, another
important trend stands out. The number of cities which showed an increase in the working-age population as a percentage of the total (12)
just about equals the number showing a decline in this ratio. However,
virtually all of the relative decline in the working-age population occurred in the older industrial cities of the Northeast and South. In
sharp contrast, the cities which gained in working-age population compared to the total were the relatively young and rapidly growing cities
of the West and Southwest. These tend to be the same cities which experienced a relatively smaller decrease in their shares of factory jobs
and money incomes compared with their surrounding suburbs.
The lesson to be learned from a review of the statistics presented
above is quite clear: the older central cities in the industrial heartland
of the nation are finding it increasingly difficult to compete for jobs to
support their population. Moreover, a rising proportion of the latter is
being made up by blacks and members of other minorities groups.
Since the latter find it difficult to compete for jobs under any circumstance, they are finding it particularly hard to get jobs in local labor
markets that are growing more slowly - or actually declining - compared with the nation as a whole. So, when attention turns to the question of structural unemployment, a major focus has to be on the
country's mature urban areas.
Against this background of long-term trends, we can look more
closely at one of the widely-supported proposals to reduce structural
unemployment over the years ahead. The proposal is embodied in the
Humphrey-Hawkins Bill.
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Expected Impact of the Humphrey-Hawkins Bill

Among many persons concerned with structural unemployment, a
considerable amount of hope is being attached to the HumphreyHawkins Bill - which aims at a significant reduction in the excessively
high level of unemployment over the next five years. The draft legislation (sponsored by the late Senator Hubert H. Humphrey and Representative Augustus F. Hawkins of California) has been modified sufficiently to attract the endorsement of President Jimmy Carter. Since
the bill has the support of the Democratic leadership in Congress as
well as of organized labor, it probably will be enacted before the end of
1978.
Given this prospect, one ought to ask whether the faith that is being
placed in the measure is justified. My own assessment of the potential
impact of the proposal leads me to be less optimistic than most of the
bill's proponents.
Expressed briefly, the Humphrey-Hawkins bill would make the reduction of unemployment the single most important objective of national economic policy. It would establish a numerical unemployment
rate of 4 percent for the civilian labor force as a whole and 3 percent
for adults (defined as those 20 years of age and over). These goals
would have to be met over a five-year period - presumably by 1983.
Another important goal - although not stated quantitatively - is a
significant reduction in the extremely high unemployment rates among
young people.
The thinking behind the bill assumes that the private sector will be
the primary source of the jobs needed to achieve the specified goals.
However, it also would mandate that the federal government use its
various economic policy instruments for the same purpose. These
would include timely reductions in income taxes for both individuals
and businesses - as well as a sizable increase in spending on training
and public service jobs. Moreover, the Federal Reserve System (which
influences interest rates and regulates the availability of money and
credit) would be required to give explicit consideration to the unemployment goals in its conduct of monetary policy. While the revised
draft recognizes that inflation is also a serious problem, the fundamental focus remains on the reduction of unemployment.
Rationale Behind Proposal

The motivations which gave rise to the Humphrey-Hawkins bill are
easily understood: unemployment among blacks and other marginal
groups has risen persistently in the last three years, while joblessness in
the nation generally has decreased somewhat as the economy recovered
from the 1973-75 recession. As noted above, between March, 1975, and
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December, 1977, the civilian labor force rose by 6,937,000 and the
black labor force climbed by 1,354,000, representing 19.5 percent of
the total rise. Over the same period, the number of jobs in the economy
expanded by 8,382,000, of which 1,328,000 (or 15 .8 percent) went to
blacks. As a result, the level of unemployment in the economy as a
whole dropped by 1,445,000, and for whites the decrease came to
1,471,000. But joblessness among blacks rose by 26,000.
Reflecting these mixed trends, the total unemployment rate (which
had been 8.5 percent in March, 1975) had decreased to 6.4 percent in
December of last year. The rate for whites was 5.6 percent (vs. 7.8
percent in March, 1975), and the rate for blacks was 12.5 percent (vs .
13.9 percent in March, 1975). Moreover, the unemployment rate for
black teenagers was 37.3 percent last December, compared with 12.6
percent for white youths. In March , 1975, the rate~ were 40.3 percent
and 17.8 percent for black and white teenagers, respectively.
Under these circumstances, reaching the Humphrey-Hawkins objectives will be a difficult task. Apparently no firm federal government
estimates have been made of the number of additional jobs that will
have to be created if the goals are to be fulfilled. In late November,
1977, Secretary of Labor Ray Marshall suggested that, during the five
years ending in 1983, at least two tax reductions of a minimum of $20
billion each plus 1.0 million extra public service jobs will be required to
get the overall unemployment rate down to 4 percent. Under the existing 1973 Manpower program, 700,000 public service jobs have already
been funded; and the new Youth Employment program introduced in
January by the Carter Administration authorized another 300,000
public service jobs. The work requirements of the Administration's
welfare reform scheme would necessitate 700,000 openings on public
payrolls; and the original draft of the new urban policy called for an
additional 300,000. These figures add up to 2 million public service
jobs by the early 1980's - about double the present number.
But, as mentioned above, the framers of the Humphrey-Hawkins
bill are clearly counting on the private sector to generate the bulk of the
new jobs. In Brimmer & Co. we have estimated that, given the outlook
for the growih of the national economy, between 1977 and 1983 the
civilian labor force may expand from 97.3 million to 107.5 million, a
gain of 10.2 million persons. During the same period, total employment may rise by 11.4 million (from 90.4 million to 101 .8 million) . The
level of unemployment might decrease by 1.2 million (from 6.9 million
to 5.7 million), cutting the unemployment rate from 7.1 percent to 5.3
percent.
If this projected 5.3 percent rate is to be cutlo 4 percent, an additional 1.4 million jobs Ivould have to be found, which would hold the
unemployment level to 4.3 million in 1983. For the private sector to
- 46-
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accomplish this task, gross national product (GNP) would have to
expand in real terms at an average annual rate in excess of 5 percent
during the next five years. Such a pace would be considerably above the
long-run growth trend which is somewhat less than 4 percent.
If sustained for such a long period of time, this above-trend rate of
growth in GNP would push output close to the limits of production
capacity and stimulate substantial inflationary pressures in an
economy in which the general price level may already be rising at an
annual rate close to 6 percent. Consequently, the inflationary potential
of the public policies required to implement the Humphrey-Hawkins
bill militates against its mandates being pursued as vigorously as its
advocates anticipate.
Moreover, the budget cost of sustaining 2 million public service jobs
is another factor working against this approach. No precise figures are
available on the anticipated cost of the program. However, the U. S.
Department of Labor estimates that in late 1977 each public service job
costs about $9,000. Thus, even without allowing for the effects of
inflation over the next five years, the 2 million public service jobs
would cost at least $18 billion. Given the Carter Administration's expressed determination to restrain the growth of federal spending, it
seems highly unlikely that it would request an appropriation of this
magnitude or spend the funds if they were voted by Congress over the
Administration's opposition.
In conclusion, both the inflationary potential and the budget cost of
the Humphrey-Hawkins bill suggest that its goals are not likely to be
pressed with a great deal of vigor. So, while the measure will undoubtedly continue to attract support, its advocates ought to scale
down somewhat the overall employment benefits they expect to flow
from its passage.
Additional Measures to Reduce Structural Unemployment
The evidence presented in the foregoing discussion has convinced me
that little real headway will be made in the reduction of structural unemployment if heavy reliance is placed on public sector jobs. Instead,
we must look to greater efforts to expand openings on private payrolls.
After all, the vast majority of American jobs are found in the private
arena rather than in the public sector. For example, in October, 1977,
there were 82.9 million persons on nonagricultural payrolls. Of this
number, 67.6 million (81.5 percent of the total) were in private employment, and 15.4 million (18.5 percent) held public sector jobs. Among
the latter, federal government employment stood at 2.7 million (3.3
percent), and state and local governments accounted for 12.6 million
(15.2 percent) of the total,
-47-
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Unfortunately, however, while the incidence of structural unemployment is most acute among blacks, the latter have historically depended
relatively more heavily on the public sector for employment than was
true of the labor force as a whole. This has been especially true of those
in professional positions. For instance, although blacks represented
about 10 percent of total nonfarm workers in private industry in 1974,
they accounted for 16 percent of all civilian employees in the federal
government. Moreover, while federal employment represented 2.8
percent of the total jobs in the economy in 1974, about 4.8 percent of
the blacks in civilian jobs were on the federal payroll.
As we focus on the expansion of job 'opportunities in the private
sector, it is clear that employers will need some kind of federal government subsidy to help offset the extra costs of hiring any significant
number of marginal workers. The Carter Administration apparently
recognizes this point. The fiscal year 1979 budget submitted to
Congress last week contains $400 million fQr this purpose. Unfortunately, there was no indication of how the funds are to be used nor of the
number of additional jobs expected to result from the expenditure.
However, even a brief analysis suggests that one ought to be reserved in
estimating the probable impact.
If one assumes that the subsidized private sector jobs would be at the
entry level and paid the present minimum wage ($2.65 per hour), the
annual payment to an employee working a 40-hour week would
amount to $5,512. The employer would have some additional out-ofpocket costs which might run as high as 15 percent of the payment to
the worker. This factor would raise the total annual cost to $6,339 per
job. Of course, there is no way to estimate how large a subsidy an employer would require to induce him to offer such a job. But given the
prospect that such a new worker's productivity is likely to be substantially below that of the average employee, the necessary subsidy
may be as large as 25 percent of the firm's cost. If this ratio were
applied, the needed subsidy would be in the neighborhood of $1,585
per job. At this rate, the $400 million in President Jimmy Carter's
budget would help to generate about 252,000 extra jobs.
This last figure should be contrasted with the number of jobs which
might result if the $400 million were spent to create public service jobs.
As noted above, an official in the U. S. Department of Labor recently
estimated that such jobs on the public payroll might cost about $9,000
each. At this rate, the $400 million would finance about 44,000 openings - a figure less than one-fifth of the number that may result from
using the funds in the private sector.
If private firms were asked to provide an additional 252,000 jobs,
partly with federal government assistance, the impact on each employer would not be very great. For example, in 1975, the 500 largest
-48-
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industrial corporations in the United States had 14,413,000 employees,
an average of 28,826 per firm. If these 500 firms alone were asked to
provide the extra 252,000 jobs, each would have to absorb about 504
additional workers. This latter figure would represent around 1.7 percent of the average number of employees on the payroll of each of
these largest corporations. Clearly, they could manage such a task and,
in fact, go far beyond such a modest request.
In addition to subsidies for new entry-level jobs, private employers
will also need inducements to locate production, distribution, and service facilities in central cities. It was shown above that such cities are
being left with a disproportionate share of total metropolitan populations, compared with the number of job opportunities in their respective metropolitan areas. On the other hand, the growing migration of
firms and the jobs they offer from central cities to suburbs reflects real
incentives (such as lower taxes, less crime, and greater availability of
skilled workers). If central cities are to compete successfully for such
employers, the latter must be offered strong incentives to remain - or
to return.
One such inducement might be found in allowing firms to draw
down, or assign, a large proportion of the unused investment tax
credits (ITC) many of them have accumulated if they establish jobcreating facilities in central cities.
In 1972 (the latest year for which U. S. Treasury figures are available), American corporations claimed $3.8 billion in new investment
tax credits (against $62.8 billion of investment outlays eligible for the
lTC). They already had $2.7 billion in carryovers from previous years,
making a total of $6.5 billion in credits that could have been used.
However, in that year, these firms claimed only $3.0 billion of the total
available, leaving unused $3.5 billion (or 53.8 percent of the total).
Businesses do not use all of their ITC eligibility for a variety of
reasons, the main one of which appears to be the lumpiness of capital
expenditures relative to taxable income. (The ITC can be used to offset
only 50 percent of tax liability.) A substantial part of the unused credits
will eventually be drawn down, but some portion will expire. So, in one
sense, such unused credits would be "wasted." Alternatively, firms
which cannot use such credits before they are scheduled to expire might
be allowed to assign their potential claims to another business who
could use them to help offset the costs of investment expenditures,
provided the latter was made in central cities or other areas suffering
from a substantial amount of structural unemployment. The extra
budget costs of such a proposal would not be very large, certainly no
larger than the potential loss in tax revenue to which the U. S. Treasury
is already exposed if firms elect to claim the tax offset for investment in
suburbia or other vigorously growing areas. The extra administrative
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burden of this approach to the management of the ITC would not be
particularly heavy since the Treasury Department has already accumulated considerable experience in administering the ITC with differentiations on the basis of varying standards of eligibility.
In the meantime, this type of linkage of the ITC to specific investment targets might enable central cities and other needy locations to
turn in a somewhat better performance in attracting job-creating
facilities.
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